In this article I describe the implicit conceptualization of social order which exists in Death Stranding — localized in both the setting and the mechanics of the game — and compare it with the conceptualization of Thomas Hobbes’s “Leviathan”. First, the theoretical tension between Death Stranding and “Leviathan” is traced: the speculative conceptualization of the Leviathan and the procedural conceptualization of Death Stranding are compared by clarifying the role that the concepts of action, authorization, right and sovereignty play in Hobbesian (...) theory and the video game. Sec­ondly, the theoretical tension between the political and natural capacities of the Sovereign according to Hobbes is explicated; with the help of mate­rial from Death Stranding, a variant of its resolution is proposed, suggest­ing the conceptualization of the Sovereign-without-a-body: an instance devoid of physical capacity and materiality, yet still capable of maintaining social order as a product of its activity. Subsequently, attention is paid to the mechanics of state expansion in Death Stranding: I describe and analyze how the Sovereign-without-a-body’s messenger — the protagonist of the video game — interacts with people outside the Sovereign’s zone of influ­ence, convincing them to consent to return to the commonwealth. This theoretical move makes it possible to supplement Hobbes’s binary scheme of the state of nature and commonwealth with a third concept — the state of memory, in which the memory of the Sovereign turns out to be a deci­sive factor influencing whether the commonwealth will be restored to its former boundaries. By explicating the Hobbesian theory of imagination, I demonstrate that — in the state of memory — the Sovereign is contingent, not fully defined, and virtual. (shrink)

Confucian wisdom is commonly assumed to consist in the Confucian value perspective as humanism in a naturalistic outlook. In fact, Confucius and Mencius sketched out a far more interesting notion of wisdom (zhi) as rooted in cognizance and flexibility and expressed in sensitive discernment and the ability to read and respond to complex, changing circumstances--to read (and respond to) the writing on the wall. Whereas the notions of tradition and the Way are thought to weigh heavily in the Confucian perspective, (...) the deeper insight and innovative action of the "wise" can transform everything and recast tradition and the Way on a more adequate basis. In his commentaries and discourses on the Four Books, Zhu Xi grasped this notion of "wisdom" and explicated its connection to several related notions, including chung (hitting the mark), yi (appropriateness), quan (weighing, discretion), and chongyong (hitting the utmost propriety in the common situation). This inquiry reveals an innovative, critical spirit in classical Confucianism that has largely lain dormant since the rise and persistence of a bureaucratic, authoritarian China after the Qin-Han period. (shrink)

Confucian wisdom is commonly assumed to consist in the Confucian value perspective as humanism in a naturalistic outlook. In fact, Confucius and Mencius sketched out a far more interesting notion of wisdom as rooted in cognizance and flexibility and expressed in sensitive discernment and the ability to read and respond to complex, changing circumstances--to read the writing on the wall. Whereas the notions of tradition and the Way are thought to weigh heavily in the Confucian perspective, the deeper insight and (...) innovative action of the "wise" can transform everything and recast tradition and the Way on a more adequate basis. In his commentaries and discourses on the Four Books, Zhu Xi grasped this notion of "wisdom" and explicated its connection to several related notions, including chung, yi, quan, and chongyong. This inquiry reveals an innovative, critical spirit in classical Confucianism that has largely lain dormant since the rise and persistence of a bureaucratic, authoritarian China after the Qin-Han period. (shrink)

The article presents an attempt to evaluate the influence of the late Wittgenstein philosophy (by the example of the rule-following problem) on sociology and some empirical programs of sociological research. At first we give a brief overview of the rule-following problem and consider, on the one hand, a skeptical reading and a skeptical solution to the problem by S. Kripke and, on the other hand, criticism towards Kripke by some Wittgensteinians). Then we reveal the role of skeptic reading in the (...) sociological works of D. Bloor and the role of anti-sceptic reading in ethnomethodological projects. At the end we show the paramount importance of Peter Winch – we prove the following thesis: the ideas of Peter Winch anticipated many of the points and arguments in the dispute between D. Bloor and ethnomethodology. (shrink)

ArgumentI believe that some pollutions are used as analogies for expressing a general view of the social order.Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger The possibility of crossing humans with other anthropoid species has been discussed in fiction as well as in scientific literature during the twentieth century. Professor Il’ya Ivanov’s attempt to achieve this was crucial for the beginning of organized primate research in the Soviet Union, and remains one of the most interesting and controversial experiments that was ever done on (...) non-human primates. The possibility of removing the boundary that separates humans from other animal species, apes in particular, is loaded with important political meaning and violates cultural and ethical taboos. The history of Ivanov’s scientific experiment thus helps to reveal some of the twentieth-century’s important cultural conventions and hidden assumptions about human nature, species, and social hierarchy. (shrink)

This paper revisits the rhetorics of system and irony in Fichte and Friedrich Schlegel in order to theorize the utopic operation and standpoint that, I argue, system and irony share. Both system and irony transport the speculative speaker to the impossible zero point preceding and suspending the construction of any binary terms or the world itself—an immanent nonplace (of the in-itself, nothingness, or chaos) that cannot be inscribed into the world's regime of comprehensibility and possibility. It is because the philosopher (...) and the ironist articulate their speech immanently from this standpoint that system and irony are positioned as incomprehensible to those framed rhetorically as incapable of occupying it. This standpoint is philosophically important, I maintain, because it allows one to think how the (comprehensibility of the) world is constructed without being bound to the necessity of this construction or having to absolutize the way things are or can be. (shrink)

In a study of three indigenous and non-indigenous cultural groups in northwestern and northeastern Siberia, framed line tests and a landscape drawing task were used to examine the hypotheses that test-based assessments of context sensitivity and independence are correlated with the amount of contextual information contained in drawings, and with the order in which the focal and background objects are drawn. The results supported these hypotheses, and inspection of the regression relationships suggested that the intergroup variations in test performance were (...) likely to result from differences in the attention accorded to contextual information, as revealed by the drawings. Social and environmental explanations for the group differences in context sensitivity are also discussed. The conclusions support the argument that cultural differences in artistic styles and perceptual tests reflect the same underlying perceptual tendencies, and they are consistent with the argument that these tendencies reflect corresponding differences in patterns of social and environmental interaction. (shrink)

As Nelson Goodman highlighted, there are two main senses of “abstract” that can be found in discussions about abstract art. On the one hand, a representation is abstract if it leaves out certain features of its target. On the other hand, something can be abstract to the extent that it does not represent a concrete subject. The first sense of “abstract” is well-known in philosophy of science. For example, philosophers discuss mathematical models of physical, biological, and economic systems as being (...) abstract in this sense. However, it is the second sense that dominates discussions of abstract art in aesthetics. For example, abstract art was (and is) considered revolutionary precisely for being non-figurative. Through an analysis of artists including Kandinsky, Malevich, and Mondrian, we develop a reading of this second sense, which we call “generative abstraction,” as opposed to “subtractive” abstraction. Generative abstraction is a process in which a new artifact is created which does not represent the initial concrete target system that inspired it (if there was one), where the artifact’s features are explored for their own sake, and where the “language” of the new artifact is in some way more “universal.” Focusing on this sense of abstraction is helpful in revealing the complexity of the process of crafting an abstract artifact, in problematizing the notion that abstraction can always be un-done (or concretized), as well as revealing new ways for abstractions to be epistemically (un)successful. (shrink)

The hundred-year history of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus we examine in the article through a gradual approach (through the refusal of researchers from obviously erroneous interpretations) to an ethical (or metaphilosophical) reading of the work. The latter explains Wittgenstein’s unambiguous indication of ethical meaning as the main meaning of the Tractatus and consistently reconciles various parts of the work (ontology, figurative theory of meaning, rejection of the theory of types and logical constants, etc.) with the latest so-called ethical and (...) mystical statements of the Tractatus and with demanding silence. An ethical (metaphilosophical) reading explains the continuing influence and relevance of the Tractatus and is presented in the article as a necessary condition for understanding the continuity between the works of early and late Wittgenstein. (shrink)

The article considers the approaches to theodicy’s problem of Russian and German philosophers with clear religious orientation: Nikolai Alexandrovich Berdyaev and Max Scheler. However, for more explicit insight into our topic we found, the article provides the general overview of theodicy tradition. Standpoints of these thinkers living in different epochs are linked by the steady belief in a reasonability of the world created by God. The main obstacle to acceptance of this argumentation is the problem of evil’s existence. The way (...) of thinking that has the goal to demonstrate the world’s perfectness presumes either necessity of evil as a mean or the evil’s insignificance or even its illusiveness, which is the result of “too human” perspective. Such ways of thought have become impossible since the second half of 19th century, when the concrete person’s experience had been recognized as a main source of philosophy. In Russian culture, this attitude became widespread after F.M. Dostoevsky, in German culture – after F. Nietzsche. Berdyaev and Scheler inherit the impulse of their thought. Distinctive feature of religious philosophies of Berdyaev and Scheler is conceptualization of the assertion of God’s need in human being, for God is in the process of becoming, is in the inner move toward full self-realization. And human being, who is capable to adopt or to reject the God’s “call,” is the crucial stage of God’s formation. For this tradition of theodicy, exactly human creative act and the direction of this act have the main role in world history. (shrink)

For over a century, Haeckel's Gastraea theory remained a dominant theory to explain the origin of multicellular animals. According to this theory, the animal ancestor was a blastula‐like colony of uniform cells that gradually evolved cell differentiation. Today, however, genes that typically control metazoan development, cell differentiation, cell‐to‐cell adhesion, and cell‐to‐matrix adhesion are found in various unicellular relatives of the Metazoa, which suggests the origin of the genetic programs of cell differentiation and adhesion in the root of the Opisthokonta. Multicellular (...) stages occurring in the complex life cycles of opisthokont protists (mesomycetozoeans and choanoflagellates) never resemble a blastula. Here, we discuss a more realistic scenario of transition to multicellularity through integration of pre‐existing transient cell types into the body of an early metazoon, which possessed a complex life cycle with a differentiated sedentary filter‐feeding trophic stage and a non‐feeding blastula‐like larva, the synzoospore. Choanoflagellates are considered as forms with secondarily simplified life cycles. (shrink)

The Maharatnakuta is a collection of Buddhist texts, the bulk of which belong to the early Mahayana tradition. Its extant versions are included in the Chinese Tripitaka as well as the Tibetan and Mongolian Kanjurs. The collection has been studied to a certain extent with the use of the Chinese and Tibetan sources but almost nothing is known of its Mongolian-language versions. The article aims to provide a preliminary study of the Ratnakuta in the Mongolian manuscript Kanjur compiled in 1628–1629. (...) It examines the structural traits of the collection, the data of the colophons and some textual elements preserved from the Tibetan original/s. The analysis reveals that, possibly, the major part of the Ratnakuta or the whole collection was translated into Mongolian en bloc in 1628–1629. The collection lacks eight sutras and places the final forty-ninth work between texts thirty-five and thirty-six. A number of textual elements preserved from the Tibetan source/s point to the proximity and possible relation of the Mongolian Ratnakuta to the Them spangs ma and Western Tibetan Kanjurs. (shrink)

This study investigates the Mongolian manuscript Kanjur preserved at the Center of Oriental Manuscripts and Xylographs of the Institute for Mongolian, Buddhist and Tibetan studies of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The manuscript previously belonged to the Chesan Buddhist monastery of Central Transbaikalia and was brought to the Buruchkom, a first academic institute of the Republic of Buryat-Mongolia by the eminent Buryat writer Khotsa Namsaraev. The manuscript is an almost complete copy of the Ligdan Khan’s Kanjur (...) presumably made in the late seventeenth to early eighteenth century in Beijing. The article presents a description, analysis and brief catalogue of Ulan-Ude manuscript Kanjur. (shrink)

The “Fish Happiness” anecdote in the Zhuangzi is a literary gem, a well-wrought urn, which simultaneously reflects and informs the “Autumn Floods” chapter,1 as well as the text as a whole.2 Despite its polish and surface clarity, the anecdote has afforded a variety of readings. Its points and assumptions tend to be muted or understated in pun, so the reader is pressed to bring his or her own intellectual wits to bear. Indeed, one wonders if the fish happiness anecdote wasn’t (...) intended as a sort of Rorschach test for the reader.3In what follows I offer a reading, nudge some insights from the happy-fish anecdote, and share some philosophical reflections. Given Zhuangzi’s avowed skepticism regarding positions and... (shrink)

In his book, Aurelien Djian investigates the history of the concept of horizon in the evolution of Husserl’s thought. Addressing the most fundamental concerns of phenomenology, Djian redefines the horizon considering themes such as coherence of experience, the reality of the world, and motivation. He suggests an approach to exploring the horizon grounded in a detailed analysis of Thing and Space lectures. A significant conclusion of Djians’s book is that the origin of the horizon should not be attributed to Ideas (...) I, but to these lectures. This discovery is not only of historical significance, but also opens up a new perspective on relations between the world, the incompleteness of external experience, and the fluidity of attention. Djian denies Saulius Geniusas’ interpretation of “halo” and “background” as psychological opposites of the horizon, which functions in the domain of ontology. These phenomena are given as elements of experience temporarily left by attention, connected with actual ones. The consciousness of unfulfilled potentialities of experience ensures the coherence of experience, making the transition from actual to potential seamless. This paper covers Djian’s conclusions and part of his work that goes beyond the content of the book. We also try to contextualize Djian’s research and show the history of studies of the horizon in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. (shrink)

Throughout all the years of independence and the systemic transformation that Ukraine is currently in, the country's official policy on religious phenomenon has undergone significant positive changes compared to the previous period. It also affected the creation of certain conditions for the functioning of different religious organizations and the very nature of the religious factor in society. In our view, the process of revival and development in the new historical conditions of Islam in the context of the specific culture of (...) the Donetsk region is quite indicative and peculiar. (shrink)

Russian philosopher Pyotr Chaadaev (1794–1856) declared Russia to be a non-place in both space and time, a singular nothingness without history, topos, or footing, without relation or attachment to the world-historical tradition culminating in Christian-European modernity. This paper recovers Chaadaev’s conception of nothingness as that which, unbound by tradition, constitutes a total, even revolutionary ungrounding of the world-whole. Working with and through Chaadaev’s key writings, we trace his articulation of immanent nothingness or the void of the Real as completely emptying (...) out the mechanisms of history and tradition, thereby putting also into question the basic conceptual machinery of modernity. Chaadaev’s position appears, as a result, not only as a neglected genealogical element to contemporary critiques of modernity and its logic of reproduction through tradition and futurity but also as a contribution to the ongoing critical rethinking of this logic in contemporary theory. (shrink)

One’s translating, reading, and understanding of texts from other eras and traditions are conditioned by tacit assumptions built into one’s own vocabulary and psycho-cultural understanding of self—of which one tends to be only intuitively aware. Thus, for example, when encountering the vocabulary in Classical Chinese for “I,” “me,” “mine,” “self,” et cetera, modern readers are inclined to import their own linguistic, cognitive, and cultural intuitions about these terms, unconsciously and without second thought. This has been particularly problematic for modern Western (...) readers of the Confucian classics, who tend to take self as ontologically and ethically individual. However, recent psychological accounts of self... (shrink)

In this paper I consider two books of Vladimir Shokhin, a distinguished philosopher in Russia, on philosophy of religion and philosophical theology as one project aimed at drawing the demarcation between these two disciplines. In what follows I will present Shokhin’s project and show briefly how it fits in with the current discussion on the topic, then, draw some consequences from his position, and make some critical notes, and at the end I will briefly present some my views on the (...) problem of drawing clear lines of demarcation between philosophy of religion and philosophical theology on the basis of the following questions: what is the topic of the disciplines, what are their methods, what are their guiding lines, and who may exercise them? (shrink)

Although largely neglected in Schelling scholarship, the concept of bliss assumes central importance throughout Schelling’s oeuvre. Focusing on his 1810–11 texts, the Stuttgart Seminars and the beginning of the Ages of the World, this paper traces the logic of bliss, in its connection with other key concepts such as indifference, the world or the system, at a crucial point in Schelling’s thinking. Bliss is shown, at once, to mark the zero point of the developmental narrative that Schelling constructs here and (...) to interrupt it at every step. As a result, bliss emerges here in its real utopian force but also its all-too-real ambivalence, indifference, and even violence, despite Schelling’s best efforts to theorize it as ‘love’; and Schelling himself emerges, in these texts, as one of modernity’s foremost thinkers not just of nature or freedom, but also of bliss in its modern afterlives. At stake in Schelling’s conception of bliss, I argue, is the very relationship between history and eternity, the not-yet and the already-here, the present, and the eschatological—as well as between Spinozian immanence and the Christian temporality of salvation, so important for modernity —not to mention the complex entanglement of indifference, violence, and love or the ideas of totality, nonproductivity, and nonrelation that Schellingian bliss involves. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the Russian Neokantian philosopher, teacher and member of the Kant Society, Moses M. Rubinstein, who attined his doctoral degree under Rickert in 1905 and who was very involved in promoting Kantianism in Russian. He is known for his public defence of Kant in 1914 at the time of the slavophile attacks on Kantian philosophy occasioned by World War I. Rubinstein's essay on “The Logical Foundations of the Hegelian System and the End of History” was published (...) in Kant-Studien in 1906. In his chief work “On the Meaning of Life”, Rubinstein attempted a synthesis of Neokantianism and the philosophy of life. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the Russian Neokantian philosopher, teacher and member of the Kant Society, Moses M. Rubinstein, who attined his doctoral degree under Rickert in 1905 and who was very involved in promoting Kantianism in Russian. He is known for his public defence of Kant in 1914 at the time of the slavophile attacks on Kantian philosophy occasioned by World War I. Rubinstein's essay on “The Logical Foundations of the Hegelian System and the End of History” was published (...) in Kant-Studien in 1906. In his chief work “On the Meaning of Life”, Rubinstein attempted a synthesis of Neokantianism and the philosophy of life. (shrink)

The article brings Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory into the empirical context of contemporary Russia to analyse the complex relationships between the state and alternative media. In contrast to the mainstream narrative that paints the picture of a strong authoritarian state with a grip over democratic liberties and civil society, we suggest a more nuanced perspective on the subject that focuses on the struggle over the articulation of the identity of the state. Through an ethnography (combined with interviews and textual (...) analysis) of three Russian alternative media outlets – Avtonom, Discours and DOXA – this article demonstrates how they critique the hegemonic state discourse, how they evade it through their practices, and how they perform counter-hegemonic alternatives. Even if their resistance is severely countered by the state, their practices are seen to de-naturalise the nodal points of centrality and unity which constitute the hegemonic state discourse. As these practices contain alternative articulations of the state discourse, the importance of alternative media for rethinking the state (and resisting it) should not be underestimated. (shrink)

A sequential reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s notes on action and intention (presented in this article) aims to stimulate a further discussion of the productivity of using Wittgenstein’s notes on action theory within social theory (and within research in moral philosophy and philosophy of law). It provides as an illustration of Wittgenstein’s consistent commitment to the principle of contextualism (suggesting an inextricable bond of social and philosophical concepts and their inclusion into various forms of life and linguistic practices). In terms of the (...) principle of contextualism, the article examines numerous attempts to incorporate the philosophy of the late Wittgenstein into social and related research (Albert Ogien, Chantal Mouffe, ethnomethodology, Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, the sociology of color). (shrink)

The consummate Soto Zen master, Dogen (1200?1253), expressed himself in creative ways that reflected fundamental insights of Chan/Zen Buddhism while responding to the needs of his time and place, i.e., Kamakura era Japan. His early training in Tendai and Rinzai Zen lent rigor and force to his Soto Zen experiences and expressions. This paper explores Dogen's new light on causality and morality purity, vis-à-vis Song dynasty Chan approaches by examining (1) his comments, early (1244) and late (ca. 1252), on the (...) Fox Koan, and (2) his discussions about Dream and ?veridical? experience. By showing the inexorability of causality, Dogen revealed the need for moral purity in achieving enlightenment qua freedom. Even in the vertigo of emptiness, the purified Soto Zen Buddhist adept discerns and effects equilibrium and, by extension, fairness, in experience, practice and affairs, as ongoing endeavors, as skilful means to impact and transform, not just Buddhist adepts, but one's world. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to consider a certain set of notions in Kant as subsumable under a single notion – that of the soul’s intensity – as well as the possibility of a transcendental grounding of this notion within Kant ’s critical framework. First, I discuss what it means for Kant to attribute intensive magnitude to the soul, starting with his response to Mendelssohn where Kant introduces the soul’s intensity as a metaphysical notion immanent to the principles of rational (...) psychology. I show, however, that in Kant ’s counter-argument there occurs a subtle though crucial shift in perspective – from the soul’s substance to its powers. Then I move on to consider three fundamental variants upon the soul’s intensity – intensities of representation, of life, and of cognition – each governed, I argue, by the implied notions of measure of intensity and its balance. Also, I examine Kant ’s accounts of the life of a species and the necessity of sickness; of intensity of “enlightenment” in a society and the benefit of ignorance; and of sermon as a practical exertion of cognition’s intensity. Next, the aforementioned shift of emphasis allows me to demonstrate that the notion of the soul’s intensity can indeed be transcendentally justified by appealing to Kant ’s principle of the Anticipations of Perception. Finally, I conclude with an appendix on the possible connection of the soul’s intensity to Kant ’s aesthetics. (shrink)

The present study has a twofold purpose: to reexamine Mozi’s 墨子 teaching of jianai 兼愛 , and to consider its possible implications regarding several deeply rooted problems endemic to the present age of global interdependence. First, the case is made that Mozi’s teaching of impartial regard is an extension of Confucius’ teaching of ren 仁 in the senses of loving others and loving broadly .1 Second, for the purposes of the present discussion, the pressing problems of the present age are (...) understood to be those rooted in the persistent asymmetries of wealth .. (shrink)

_Hegel and Schelling in Early Nineteenth-Century France_ is a two-volume work that documents the French reception of G. W. F. Hegel and F. W. J. Schelling from 1801 to 1848. It shows that the story of the "French Hegel" didn't begin with Wahl and Kojève by giving readers a solid understanding of the various ways in which German Idealism impacted nineteenth-century French philosophy, as well as providing the first ever English-language translations of excerpts from the most important philosophical texts of (...) the era. Inside volume one, readers will find a number of interpretative frameworks to help them get to grips with this neglected field in the history of ideas. In addition to excerpted translations and a narrative of Hegel’s and Schelling’s fate in France during the early nineteenth century, this volume includes an introduction on transnational reception history, as well as an analytical catalogue of the translations of their work produced in French at this time, of the publications which appropriated or interrogated their philosophical legacy, and of the journals, institutional structures and other mechanisms of dissemination that brought Hegel’s and Schelling’s philosophy into France. The book thus details the ways in which French philosophers of the period took up the debates and concepts of German Idealism, transformed them or rejected them. In this way, it aims to contribute to a reversal of the serious neglect of early nineteenth-century French thought in English-language scholarship and, in so doing, goes beyond a nation-based narrative of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This dissertation demonstrates that Chu Hsi forged a compelling ethical theory out of his insights into the requirements of moral self-cultivation. These insights led him to realize that a person's mind forms his seat of volition and thus provides for his capacities of moral self-determination and responsibility. Understanding that a person's cultivation efforts must be focused largely on his mind, so as to transform his intentions and inform his sense of appropriateness, Chu Hsi developed his ethical theory. In ways similar (...) to Kant's, this ethical theory crystallized around the notion of moral will, constituted on the heavenly-principle invested in one's nature: To achieve moral worth, one must have anchored his volition in the feeling of ching and informed it with a knowledge of principle. ;Chapter I recounts Chu Hsi's early learning, youthful eclecticism and subsequent return to Confucianism. It presents his intellectual development to 1164, tracing his eclectic phase and transition to Confucianism in light of his poetry of the time. It concludes with a discussion of his new Confucian outlook. ;Chapter II elucidates Chu Hsi's theory of moral self-realization by tracing its development. It introduces the two-state model of consciousness central to Neo-Confucian moral psychology, then studies Chu Hsi's attempts to work within this model. Finally, it explains Chu Hsi's breakthrough to his dynamic mind-centered approach to moral self-realization. ;Chapter III examines Chu Hsi's resulting command conception of mind and explores his view of the relationship between mind and the nature. It then presents his cultivation theory against this background as a methodology by which a person can transform his mind into a moral will. ;Chapter IV, drawing upon Chu Hsi's command conception of mind, argues that Chu Hsi's ethical theory, like Kant's, crystallized around the notion of moral will, constituted on heavenly-principle. It indicates that this model revivified Confucian ethics and that it is suggestive for contemporary ethical discussion in virtue of Chu Hsi's organic conception of principle. (shrink)